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This paper compares bribery to competitive bidding in a government purchasing context. While competitive bidding is one 
method of procurement, bribery is a common alternative in many Third World countries. Although bribery is often considered 
to be the ethical antithesis of competitive bidding, the analysis shows there is a fundamental isomorphism between bribery and 
competitive bidding on the supply side of the transaction. 
1. Introduction 
Government contracts for goods and services are often awarded on the basis of competitive 
bidding, partly to reduce opportunities for bribe-taking. ’ Various Third World countries, however, 
award such contracts administratively under the influence of bribery. In 1977, the Carter Administra- 
tion sponsored Congressional legislation which now prohibits U.S. firms and individuals from paying 
bribes to foreign goverment officials. The purpose of this note is to model bribery as an arrangement 
for procurement in thin markets, and to compare bribery to the alternative of competitive bidding. 
Although bribery and bidding are considered to be ethical antitheses, we identify conditions under 
which these two exchange mechanisms exhibit a fundamental isomorphism. Specifically, we show that 
the same supplier will win the contract under both exchange mechanisms and that the expected 
net-of-bribes price paid by the purchasing country will be equal to the expected value of the winning 
bid. Under these conditions, controversies about the relative efficiency of bribery versus bidding may 
be moot. ’ 
* We are grateful for comments from Vie Bernard, Gary Biddle. Michael Bradley. Joel Demski. Ronald Dye. John 
Eichenseher, Aneel Karnani, Wilham Kinney. Glenn Loury, Sam Peltzman. David Sappington. Thomas Stober, Martin 
Zimmerman and participants in workshops at the Universities of Illinois and Michigan. This research was supported in part 
by the University of Illinois College of Commerce and The University of Michigan Business School. 
’ See Alchian (1977) Rose-Ackerman (1978) and Holt (1980). 
* See Rose-Ackerman (1978) for a discussion of the comparative efficiencies of market and ‘corrupt’ methods of dealing with 
government officials. Also see. for example, U.S. House of Representatives (1977) for political debate about the inefficiency 
of bribes to foreign government officials. 
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2. Tbe bribery model 
Corporate filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission’indicate that bribes to foreign 
government officials usually take the form of a commission. ’ Typically, the government pays an 
inflated invoice price. and the supplier kicks back a portion of the invoice price to the official, a third 
party intermediary, or a designated bank account after the contract is awarded. 4 
We model the commission bribery transaction in a governmental procurement context in which the 
contract could be awarded competitively to the supplier submitting the lowest bid price or awarded at 
a predetermined price to the firm paying the largest bribe. In the bribery model. each potential 
supplier is assumed to negotiate privately with a governmental official. Hence. the information 
available to bribery participants is similar to the information available to bidders in that firms do not 
know the bribe offers of other firms. Suppliers are assumed to know the government’s policy of 
awarding the contract to the firm offering to pay the largest commission bribe. Suppliers are assumed 
to know their own costs, but have incomplete information about competitors’ costs and profits. Our 
analysis is restricted to symmetric games in which firms’ information is modelled by the distribution 
F(z), which is twice differentiable and an increasing function of 2. Given these assumptions, B(z) 
has an inverse which is denoted by YT(. ) and. by definition. 7~( B( ;)) = 2. 
We use the following notation in the models: 
P: 
(‘1 
- = p - (‘1 
B: 
F( 2): 
the contract invoice price. 
the cost of supplying the product (excluding bribes), 
the gross profit from the contract. 
the bribe to be paid to the government official. 
the cumulative probability distribution for :. defined over the interval [;, i]. where z 2 0, 
and 
II : the number of firms competing for the contract. 
Suppliers’ response futiction 
Assuming that all firms employ a common strategy. B(z), and behave independently, the largest 
bribe will be paid by the firm having the largest profit. and the associated probability is F( z,)‘~‘. 
Since F( :,)‘I-’ = F( T( B))“- ‘, the ith firm’s expected payoff is 
E[+( B)] = [z, - B]F(m( B))“? 
where E denotes the expectation operator and +(B) is the payoff from bribe B. 
Propositior~ I Given the above assumptions. the (symmetric) equilibrium hrihey strategv for the ith 
,firnl is 
=‘F(t)“m’dt/F(z,)“? i= 1, n, (2) 
bthere t is a clunzmy rmiahle of integration. 
Detailed descriptions of these hriherv activities can he found III U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (1976), filings on 
X-K and 10-K forms wth the Securiks and Exchange Commission. and in Greanias and Windsor (1982). 
4 See dracrlptiona of bribery transactions in Lodhcwl Corporurron [U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (1979)]. In rr 
w&d ure [U.S. Court of Appeals (19X2)]. and Crank and Windsor (1982). 
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Proof. The equilibrium bribery strategy is determined by differentiating eq. (1) with respect to B. 
(d/dB)E[+(B)] = -F(T(B))“~’ +[z,-B](n-l)F(n$B))‘-‘/(T(B))&(B). 
Since B = B(z) and T( B( 2)) = z, it follows that a’( B( z)) = l/B’( 2). After making 
substitutions, one can verify that the necessary condition for an interior optimum is 
-B’(z,)F(z,)“_’ + [Z, -B(z,)]F(z,)“pZf(z,)=O. 







where k is a constant of integration. Integrating the right-hand side of (5) by parts, one can verify 
that 
(6) 
Substituting the right-hand side of (6) into (5) and dividing by F( z,)“~‘. 
B(z,)=z,- 
Jc 
“F(t)“p’ dt/F(z,)“-’ + k/F(z,)“? (7) 
One can verify that, as z, + I, the first term on the right-hand side has a limit of g and the second 
term has a finite limit using L’Hospital’s rule. Therefore, k must be identically zero because otherwise 
the bribe would be infinitely negative for k < 0 or else violate the monotonicity property for k > 0. 
The resulting bribery strategy can be shown to be consistent with a Nash equilibrium by verifying 
that B( z,) is a best-response when other competitors also employ B( .). Q.E.D. 
Proposition 1 indicates that, in equilibrium, each firm submits a bribe offer which represents a 
markdown from its potential gross profit. The markdown term can be analyzed further by manipulat- 




The left-hand side of (8) is the expected value of the bribe paid by the ith firm, while the 
right-hand side is the expected gross profit of the fifm submitting the second largest bribe (given that 
the ith firm submits the largest bribe). Thus, (8) indicates that the ith firm’s expected bribe is 
effectively bounded by the expected gross profit of the second lowest cost firm. A further property of 
the bribery model in (2) is that the expected bribe paid to the governmental official is a non-decreas- 
ing function of n. Increased competition among firms affects the equilibrium bribe by increasing the 
probability of including the most profitable (lowest cost) producer and by inducing firms to become 
more aggressive. A statistical explanation is that. as the number of firms increases, the largest bribe 
(n th order statistic) converges in mean square to the (finite) upper support of the industry gross profit 
distribution. Furthermore, the difference between the expected values of the nth and n - 1 order 
statistics also can be shown to be a decreasing function of n. Hence, the governmental official is able 
to exploit the thinness of the market by extracting producers’ surplus in the form of a bribe. 
3. Bribery and bidding institutions 
The isomorphism between the bribery and bidding institutions is now established in two proposi- 
tions. Proposition 2 presents the equilibrium bidding strategy for a game in which competitors have 
the same amount of information and costs as in the bribery model presented above. Proposition 3 
then shows that, for a given contract price, the expected return to each firm from the equilibrium 
bribery strategy is the same as the expected return from the equilibrium bidding strategy derived 
above. 
Proposition 2. Assuming thut each firm knows its own cost und assesses u common distribution of costs 
for competitors G(c). the equilibrium bidding strutegv is 
h(c)=c+ (“[l -G(s)]“~‘ds/[l -G(c)]“? (9) 
rr,here ? is the upper support of G( . ) und s is u dumm.v ruriuhle of integrution. 
Proof. The equilibrium strategy can be derived using an approach similar to that in Proposition 1. 
Interested readers can obtain the details of the derivations from the authors. 
We now compare the expected payoffs from the equilibrium bidding strategy in (9) with those 
from the equilibrium bribery strategy in (2). 
Proposition 3. For u gioen contract price. P. firms’ expected pu_voffs from the equilibrium brihety 
strutegy ure equal to the payoffs from the equilibrium bidding strategy. 
Proof. The expected net payoff to a firm employing the equilibrium bribery strategy is obtained by 
substituting (2) into (l), 
= ‘)‘(t)f’-l dt. (11) 
The expected net payoff from the equilibrium bidding strategy is 
E[cp(j(c,))] =J’cl - G(s))~-' ds. 
(‘, 
By definition of the cumulative distribution function, 
F(z,)=Pr(;<z,). 
Recalling that z = P - c and z, = P - c,, 
Pr(z<z,)=Pr[(P-c)<(P-c,)], 





(16) = 1 - G(c,). 
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Thus, F(z) = 1 - G(c) point-wise. Since _I = P - T and Z = P - c. the range of integration in (11) 
is also consistent with (12). This can be verified by recognizing that firm i will win the symmetric 
bidding game when c, > c, for i #j, j = 1. n. But c, > c, implies that P - c, < P - c,. so 2, -c z,, for 
i #j, j = 1, n. Finally, the reversal in the direction of integration in (12) relative to (11) takes into 
account that F(z,)“-’ is an increasing function of Z, over [z, Z] while [l - G(c,)]” -’ is a decreasing 
function of c, over [c, (:I. Hence, the expected net payoffs in (11) and (12) are equal. Q.E.D. 
The isomorphism between the equilibrium outcomes of the bidding and bribery games can be 
explained by the fact that the bribe actually is a covert discount paid by the supplier to the 
government official. rather than to the state. In effect. the government official implicitly conducts a 
covert bidding game in which the purchase is made at the lowest bid price and then resold at the 
invoice price, P. Since the contract is awarded to the same supplier and the same net-of-bribes price 
is paid by the government, both institutions are equally effective in extracting suppliers’ surplus. 
Hence, in the absence of penalties for bribery. suppliers will be indifferent between paying bribes or 
discounting the selling price to the purchasing country. 
4. Conclusions and implications 
This paper has presented and compared an equilibrium model of bribery to a competitive bidding 
model. For a predetermined contract price, the bribery model was shown to be isomorphic to the 
bidding model in that the same firm won the contract and the government paid the same 
net-of-bribes purchase price. These results imply that, in the absence of penalties for bribery, supplier 
firms would be indifferent between bribery and bidding institutions. It all suppliers face the same 
penalty, then the equilibrium bribe would be reduced by the amount of the penalty, and the 
isomorphism between bribery and bidding would be retained. This isomorphism on the supply side 
may explain why exporting countries (except for the United States, after 1977) generally do not 
impose penalties for paying bribes to government officials in importing countries where bribery is 
legal. 
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